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Abstract: Fierce market competition has been big obstacle in the growth process of 
sustainable/green production industry.  Sustainable production lines often come into play by 
penetrating into traditional Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). This is due to the high 
setup cost and opportunity risks. In this study, we look into the scenario when traditional 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) introduce green production lines into their 
production systems. We want to address the questions whether and how the green production 
lines can survive in the market competitions. Analyses are conducted between ordinary and 
green production sectors which produce a similar type of product with different materials and 
techniques. A game theoretic model is formulated to analyze the competition in the market. 
Sensitivity analyses and numerical examples can provide suggestions to assist policy makers, 
government, company executives and consumers to make better and rational decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
As the global awareness and concerns about the environment issues increase, many governments, 
regulatory organizations and business leaders have begun to call on the manufacturing and 
business community to play a leading role in the process of moving the global economy toward 
sustainability. At the same time, people from both academia and industry start to realize that 
there exists an intrinsic business value in the sustainability practices. However, fierce market 
competition and price sensitivity have been big obstacles in the development and growth of 
sustainable/green production industry.  Therefore, green production lines are often initiated by 
penetrating into traditional Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). This is due to the high 
setup cost and the embedded opportunity risks.  
The concept of “sustainability” was first introduced in the Brundtland Report of the UN 
World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 [WCED, 1987]. “Sustainability” 
is defined as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability for the future 
generations to meet their needs.” This definition includes environmental, economic, and social 
goals, in which it claims that long-term environmental protection requires appropriate economic 
development and society involvement. In the manufacturing sector, “sustainable manufacturing 
is defined as the creation of manufactured products that use processes that are non-polluting, 
conserve energy and natural resources, and are economically sound and safe for employees, 
communities, and consumers [sustainable manufacturing]”. Therefore, sustainable manufacturing 
encompasses green manufacturing processes and the output of the production processes-- 
sustainable products. Sustainable products often refer to those products which “providing 
environmental, social and economic benefits while protecting public health, welfare, and 
environment over their full commercial cycle, from the extraction of raw materials to final 
disposition [sustainable products].” 
There has been extensive research done in the area of sustainable production and 
marketing, especially in the studies to understand how different societal sectors respond as new 
governmental regulations come up and the environmental awareness increases in the public 
domain. The trend nowadays is that more and more consumers start to realize the importance of 
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incorporating environmental concerns into their consumption decision making processes. A 
recent market survey suggests that 52%-59% of private households in the United States would be 
willing to pay a price premium to buy electricity that was produced using renewable energy 
technology [1999]. M. Janssen and W. Jager [2002] utilized simulation methodology to study the 
introduction process of green products to the market. Kleindorfer, Singhal and Wassenhove 
[2005], in their paper, discuss the challenges of integrating environment, health and safety 
concerns into green product design. In addition, green operations management and closed-loop 
supply chains issues are addressed from a conceptual perspective in the paper.  
Game theory has been one of the most popular methodologies in the study of market 
competition in the sustainability domain. K. Conrad [2005] carried out a study on market 
implications of product differentiation when there exists an environmentally conscious consumer 
sector. A spatial duopoly model is utilized to determine how the phenomenon affects the prices 
and market shares. Governments and regulatory organizations are also taking steps to achieve the 
goal of sustainable development. Two examples include green production subsidy and tax 
reduction imposed by the government. S. Bansal and S. Gangopadhyay [2003] studies two types 
of policies (tax based policy and subsidy based policy) in the presence of consumers who are 
concerned about the environmental issues. Chialin Chen [2001] developed a quality-based model 
for analyzing the strategic and policy issues concerning the development of products with 
conflicting traditional and environmental attributes. R. H. Wiser and S. J. Pickle [1998] studied 
the green electricity market by conducting market surveys in California (one of the four pioneer 
states that emphasize sustainable development). They conclude that consumer education is 
critical in the green industry development process and the growth of the green market, in a large 
extent, relies on the public policies. 
In real life, the process of green products penetrating into the manufacturing/production 
sector and then into the competitive market often begins with introducing green production 
departments in the ordinary production companies, mostly Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs). For example, Toyota produces both conventional internal combustion engine cars, such 
as Corolla, Avalon, Camry and hybrid electric vehicle, such as Prius and Touring [Toyota 
Corporation].There is a lack of literature in this study, especially from the quantitative point of 
view. The objective of this paper is to understand the environment related decisions facing firms, 
consumers and policy makers, and how to help green products better survive in the market 
Rio´s International Journal on Sciences of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Management 
Editor-in-Chief: Dr. Heitor Luiz Murat de Meirelles Quintella, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
 4 
competition. This study can assist these stakeholders make better decisions to achieve the win-
win situation from the entire societal perspective. 
This study considers the market competition between green and ordinary production 
sectors from a quantitative point of view. A game theoretic model with Nash equilibrium is 
developed and analyzed. Managerial and business insights for policy maker and business leaders 
are derived from the analyses and computational results. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows: the game theoretical model is introduced in section 2, including the Cournot model 
and the Nash equilibrium. Sensitivity analyses of the model parameters are discussed in section 
3, and the numerical examples with managerial insights are utilized to demonstrate the approach 
in section 4. This paper concludes with insights and suggestions to consumers, manufacturing 
and government sectors in section 5.  
 
 
 
2. Model Formulation 
Companies introduce green manufacturing sector either due to legislation or marketing 
considerations at the green production initiation stage. Many green companies would have a 
mixture of both green and ordinary production sectors in the same company. In this section, the 
game theory model to analyze the market competition between conventional and sustainable 
production sectors is introduced. 
2.1 Scenario Description 
Suppose there are s Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the market. Each OEM has 
both conventional production department that uses ordinary materials and/or techniques, and 
sustainable production department that uses green techniques and/or materials for production. 
We are mainly considering the scenario where there are both green and ordinary production 
sectors in the same company. We call them green and ordinary production departments, 
respectively. The competition among these production departments is assumed to be Cournot, 
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which means that the OEM companies independently and simultaneously determine their supply 
quantities of green and ordinary production in order to maximize their own profits.  
 
Notations: 
O
iq  : the supply quantity by an ordinary production departments i; 
G
jq  : the supply quantity by a green production departments j; 
OQ : the total supply of ordinary products in the market, where 
1
:
s
O O
i
i
Q q
=
= ∑  ; 
O
iQ− : the total supply of ordinary products in the market excluding the supply from 
ordinary production departments i , where Oi
OO
i qQQ −=− ; 
GQ : the total supply of ordinary and green products, where 
1
:
s
G G
j
j
Q q
=
=∑ ;
 
G
jQ− : the total supply of green products in the market excluding the supply from green 
production departments  j , where Gj
GG
j qQQ −=− ; 
Oc , 
Gc : unit production costs of ordinary and green products, respectively; 
Op , 
Gp : prices (price consumers consider when they make their consumption choices, 
including their conception of long-term consumption price and effect on the 
environment) of ordinary and green products, respectively; 
Oρ , Gρ : cash prices (price consumers pay upfront when they make their purchases) of 
ordinary and green products, respectively. 
2.2 Model Assumptions  
      In the model formulation, the following assumptions are made: 
• All ordinary companies have the same unit production cost Oc , and all green 
companies have the same unit production cost Gc .  
• Prices of the ordinary and green products are determined by the inverse demand 
functions: 
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)( GOO QQbap θ+−= ,       (1) 
)( OGG QQbap θ+−= .       (2) 
• In the demand functions, a and b are positive constants, and θ  is the substitution 
parameter.  The constant a  bears the meaning of the upper bound price (the price is so 
high that no one will choose to consume it). The constant b  is the unit price decrease of 
the product. The substitution parameter θ  usually lies between 0 and 1. If the ordinary 
and green products are highly substitutable, then the value of θ  is close to 1; if these 
products are distinct and non-substitutable, then the value of θ  is close to 0. A negative 
value of θ  indicates the complementarity of the products.  
• Price p  consists of two components: the cash price ρ and the long-term 
consumption price λ . For example, ρ  is the cash price of a light bulb on the price tag, 
while λ  is the long-term electricity consumption price of the light bulb.  
• Besides economical long-term consumption price paid by the consumer directly, 
environmental effect price could also be considered into λ . This is due to the fact that 
when consumers make their consumption choices, they may consider whether it is good 
or bad for the environment.  The environmental effect price is paid by the whole society 
in the long run.  
• Consumers are assumed to take both the cash price ρ and the long-term price λ  
into account in their purchasing behavior. 
2.3 Model Formulation and Nash Equilibrium 
In the model formulation, each OEM company produces both ordinary and green products. We 
call them “hybrid” companies. Their decision problem is to determine how many of each type of 
products (green or ordinary) to produce in order to maximize their own profits. 
Suppose there are s such “hybrid” companies in the market. Given the total quantities of 
ordinary and green products by other companies ∑
=
− −=
s
i
O
k
O
i
O
k qqQ
1
  and ∑
=
− −=
s
i
G
k
G
i
G
k qqQ
1
, the 
profit of company k is: 
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To obtain the best response of OEM company k, we set the first derivative 
of ),;,( Gk
O
k
G
k
O
kk QQqq −−π  to be zero: 
      
           (4) 
Therefore, the best response of company k is: 
 
                                      (5) 
To prove that this is the maximum rather than a saddle point, we can take the second 
derivatives: 
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Under Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we have ** ))(1()( Ok
O
k qsQ −=−  and 
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G
k qsQ −=− . Substituting these two equations into equation for the best response of 
company k above, we have the quantity supply under equilibrium:  
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3. Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we analyze how sensitive the equilibrium is to the parameters: substitution factor 
parameter θ , green production cost Gc , long-term consumption price for green product Gλ  and 
number of hybrid companies in the market s.  
The market share of green products under Cournot-Nash equilibrium is defined as: 
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The methodology used to analyze the sensitivity of the equilibrium to the parameter is 
also by taking the partial derivatives of the market share with respect to the corresponding 
parameters. 
 
3.1. Sensitivity of Gβ  to θ : 
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If GGOO cc +<+ λλ , then 0<∂
∂
θ
β G . This is true in most cases nowadays since cost of 
green production is often significantly higher than ordinary ones. 
 
Engineering and Managerial Insights: 
As long as the sum of cost and long-term price of the green product exceeds that of the 
ordinary one, a smaller substitution parameter is beneficial to increase the green market 
share. This result reinforces the importance of a smaller θ, which will increase the market 
share of green products under dynamic equilibrium. 
Distinguishing green products from ordinary ones will help the growth of green 
production sector. Toyota Prius is popular not only because of the hybrid feature, but also 
due to its unique appearance.  
 
 
3.2. Sensitivity of Gβ  to Gc : 
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Engineering and Managerial Insights: 
Since (1 ) 0θ+ >  and 0O Oa cλ− − > , therefore,
 
0
G
Gc
β∂ <∂ . Decreasing the green 
production cost can help the growth of green production industry.  
• In the short run, this can be achieved by subsidy to green product manufacturers 
and tax credit or tax deduction to green product consumers. According to Richard 
A. Chapo [2006], for Toyota Prius, the tax credits that come with each purchase 
certainly add to their popularity. 
• In the long run, green companies should take steps to improve the production 
technology to bring down the cost. Watanabe, one of Toyota’s top executives, 
said, “we need to improve the production engineering and develop better 
technology in batteries, motors, and inverters, and my quest is to produce a third-
generation Prius quickly and cheaply.” [Taylor, 2006] 
 
3.3. Sensitivity of Gβ  to Gλ : 
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Engineering and Managerial Insights: 
• Decreasing the long-term consumption price of green products will increase the 
market share under dynamic equilibrium. 
• Public awareness effects are incorporated into the long-term consumption price. 
For example, the long-term consumption price for Toyota Prius includes the customer’s 
impression of the gasoline cost over its driving lifetime as well as the negative effect 
(cost) to the environment. 
• Educational programs to increase the public awareness will be very useful. This is 
because that decreasing the consumer’s conception of long-term consumption price of 
green products is good for the green production. 
 
3.4. Sensitivity of Gβ  to s: 
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As we can see, 0
G
s
β∂ =∂ , therefore,  a change in the number of companies in the 
market won’t change the market equilibrium. 
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Engineering and Managerial Insights: 
• The number of companies in the market will not affect the market share of green 
production industry. Therefore, a company entering and leaving the market won’t affect 
the market equilibrium. This conclusion is conter-intuitive since the more companies in 
the market, the more competitions there exist, which should affect the market share of 
green production department. 
• One explanation is that every company will produce same mixture of green and 
ordinary products at market equilibrium. They are assumed to be symmetric at market 
equilibrium. Therefore, what really affects the market share of green products is the 
percentage of green and ordinary production of each company at the equilibrium.  
 
In order to further demonstrate and explain the results and conclusions in this section, 
numerical examples to demonstrate model formulation and analyses are presented in the 
following section.  
 
4. Numerical Examples 
In this section, we demonstrate and validate the model formulation with some numerical 
examples.  
We consider a market where there are )100(=n  automobile companies which produce 
both ordinary cars (cars with conventional internal combustion engine) and green cars with little 
negative effect to the environment.  Toyota Prius (a hybrid electric vehicle in the automobile 
market) is chosen as the green product while its counterpart as the ordinary product is the Toyota 
Corolla 2008. 
 
Model parameters: 
• Production cost and long-term consumption cost of ordinary product: we use the 
same product (Toyota Corolla 2008) as ordinary product in both models, 
therefore, these two parameters stay the same: 299,12$=Oc  and 403,16$=Oλ . 
• Production cost of green product: hybrid electric vehicle is said to be far more 
expensive than the manufacturer’s suggested price [Jones, 2003]. Due to the fact 
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that the hybrid electric vehicle production technology and sales has been 
improved a lot [Jerome, 2007 1], we assume that the production cost of Toyota 
Prius is same as its listed price which is $21,760 [Toyota Corporation].  
• Long-term consumption cost of green product: both gasoline costs and emission 
costs are calculated into the total long-term consumption cost term. The gasoline 
costs are based on a price of $3/gallon. The local and highway combined fuel 
economy for Toyota Prius is 46 mpg [Toyota Corporation]. The lifetime driving 
is assumed to be 150,000 miles. The emission costs are calculated to be $440 
based on the study conducted by Lave and Maclean [2002]. Therefore, the long-
term consumption cost 223,10$=Gλ .  
• Demand function parameters are )(10 OOca λ+=  and ab 0001.0= . Substitution 
parameter is set to be 9.0=θ  . This is due to the fact that HEV and ordinary cars 
are very similar in terms of functionality.  
 
We study this numerical example by answering the following questions:  
1. How do hybrid companies perform in the market competition? 
The market equilibrium scenario which compares the green car (Toyota Prius) production 
and ordinary car (Toyota Corolla) production sectors is summarized in table 1.      
 
    Table 1  A comparison of ordinary and green car production sectors under market equilibrium 
 Ordinary Sector 
(Toyota Corolla) 
Green Sector 
(Toyota Prius) 
Production of a single company 52.26→52 40.94→41 
Market supply 5226 4094 
Cost ($) 12299 21760 
Cash price ($) 14857 24285 
Long-term price ($)        16403 10223 
Profit of a single company ($) 133660 103380 
Market share             56.07% 43.93% 
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We see from Table 1 that the overall market share of green products is relatively 
low. However, comparing the current automobile market situation and the market 
equilibrium derived here, there is still room for growth in the green production industry. 
Therefore, the objective here is to find out how green production industry can better 
survive and occupy more market share. This is done by investigating some other 
scenarios when model parameters change. 
 
2. How does production cost of the green product (Toyota Prius) Gc  affect the 
dynamic equilibrium? 
In this scenario, the cost of green products is reduced by 10% due to tax reduction, and 
the market equilibrium is summarized in Table 2: 
 
       Table 2  A summary of market equilibrium after 10% reduction of green production cost 
 Ordinary Sector 
(Toyota Corolla) 
Green Sector 
(Toyota Prius) 
Production of a single company 48.71→49 44.89→45 
Market supply 4871 4489 
Cost ($) 12299 19584 
Cash price ($) 14857 22131 
Long-term price ($) 16403 10223 
Profit of a single company ($) 124570 114330 
Market share 52.04% 47.96% 
 
As we can see from Table 2, under market equilibrium, the market share of Toyota Prius 
has increased by 4% when the production cost of Toyota Prius has decreased by 10%. 
This might not be feasible in the short run, however, tax credit or subsidy for consumers 
and manufacturers respectively can achieve this goal in the near future. This scenario 
demonstrates the effectiveness of subsidy/tax reduction for green companies. 
 
3. How does long-term consumption price for a green product (Toyota Prius) 
Gλ  affect the dynamic equilibrium? 
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 In this scenario, we consider how the long-term consumption price affects the market 
competition and the dynamic equilibrium. 
Nowadays, the long-term price advantage of green products over ordinary ones is 
under realized. For example, the consumers probably know that Toyota Prius is more 
expensive and will save gasoline consumption over the lifetime. However, they may not 
be aware Toyota Prius can save over $6,000 over its driving lifetime.  
In this scenario, the long-term price advantage of green products (Toyota Prius) 
over ordinary counterparts (Toyota Corolla) is unrealized, and Gλ  is incorrectly 
perceived to be 10% larger than its true value: .11245$%110)( ' =⋅= GG λλ  
The dynamic equilibrium is summarized in Table 3: 
 
Table 3  A summary of market equilibrium after 10% increase of long-term price for Prius 
 Ordinary Sector 
(Toyota Corolla) 
Green Sector 
(Toyota Prius) 
Production of a single company 53.93→54 39.09→39 
Market supply 5393 3909 
Cost ($) 12299 21760 
Cash price ($) 14857 24275 
Long-term price ($) 16403 11245 
Profit of a single company ($) 137930 98302 
Market share 57.98% 42.02% 
 
This scenario also demonstrates the importance of public awareness of the green 
products’ economical and environmental advantage, since it is easier to achieve in the 
short run. 
4. How does substitution parameter θ  affect the market equilibrium? 
Suppose the green companies further distinguish their products with 8.0=θ . This could 
be accomplished by improving the design of the products, or by administrative 
requirement, or by increased public preference for green products. The resulting market 
equilibrium is summarized in Table 4: 
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Table 4  A summary of market equilibrium after substitution parameter θ  reduced to 0.8 
 Ordinary Sector 
(Toyota Corolla) 
Green Sector 
(Toyota Prius) 
Production of a single company 52.02→52 46.36→46 
Market supply 5202 4636 
Cost ($) 12299 21760 
Cash price ($) 14857 24285 
Long-term price ($) 16403 10223 
Profit of a single company ($) 133050 117070 
Market share 52.88% 47.12% 
 
As we can see from the computational results, the decrease in the substitution parameter 
can lead to an increase in the market share for green product (Toyota Prius). These results 
further demonstrate the importance of reducing the substitution parameter. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, a game theoretic model is formulated to study the competitions between ordinary 
and green companies/manufacturing sectors which produce the similar/same type of products 
with different techniques and costs. The competition among the Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) is assumed to be Cournot. Each company independently and 
simultaneously determines their supply quantities of green and ordinary products in order to 
maximize their own profits.  
The Nash equilibrium for this game theory model is obtained. Sensitivity analysis is also 
used to study the possible actions that could be taken to help increase the market share of green 
products in the market. These results are demonstrated with numerical examples.  
 
 The engineering and managerial insights are summarized as follows.   
1. Green manufacturing sectors need to distinguish their products from ordinary ones to 
gain competitive edges in the market. 
2. Public awareness of the advantage of green products is important for the healthy 
growth of green manufacturing sectors in the companies. 
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3. Subsidy/tax reduction could help increase the market share of green products in the 
market.  
 
In summary, to distinguish green products from their ordinary counterparts, to increase 
public awareness and to impose tax benefits are among the effective policies/methods to better 
help green production industry survive and thrive in the fierce market competition. The major 
contribution of study is that the game theory model formulation provides a new perspective to 
analyze the market competition between green and ordinary production sectors. The effects of 
the government and regulatory organizations interventions are considered, such as tax 
reduction/subsidy for green products, standard on carbon dioxide emission and education for 
public awareness. The sensitivity analyses address more realistic market scenarios and 
investigate how the market share is influenced by various decisions. The mathematical model 
can provide both engineering and managerial insights for the manufacturers, consumers and the 
government regulatory department.  
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